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Abstract 
This paper sets out to explore the extent to which the moral dimension is an essential component in 
organizational life. From a theoretical viewpoint, it argues that institutional theory lacks a positive 
account of the role of morality at the organizational level. We propose that this can be addressed by 
integrating the work of the moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre with institutional theory’s notions 
of logics, contradictions and legitimacy. Empirically, we look to a group of Christian churches in the 
north east of England to provide insights into practitioners’ concerns with the telos of their 
organizations and the core practices of their faith, and hence of an essential concern for the morality 
of organizational life. We conclude that any understanding of practice-based organizations which 
ignores or underplays the moral dimension will give, at best, a diminished account of organizational 
life, and hence that institutional theory needs to rethink its neglect of morality. 
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Introduction 
As Munir (2015, p. 90) asserts, new institutional theory’s hegemony in organization theory has 
become established over the past decade and more. There is no doubt that through its exploration 
of logics, legitimacy, entrepreneurship and, more recently, institutional work, institutional theory 
has covered a large amount of ground, from the actions of individual agents through to a deeper 
understanding of organizational fields and institutional orders, and their interrelationships. And yet, 
perhaps blinded by its own success, institutional theory may have forgotten the problems which it 
originally set out to address. Concerns have emerged from within and without (Suddaby, 2010; and 
more recently in a dialog section of this journal Munir, 2015; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 2015; Willmott, 
2015). While general disquiet has been expressed over institutional theory’s inability to be critical, 
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and its lack of attention to issues of power (Munir, 2015; Willmott, 2015), more specific concerns 
have surfaced over its failure to engage both with “broader moral issues related to inequality and 
stratification” (Hirsch & Lounsbury, 2015, p. 97) and moral philosophy (Munir, 2015). As Munir 
contends: “the tendency of institutional theorists to overlook issues of moral philosophy or ethics 
has an unfortunate negative externality for the theoretical basis of institutional theory” (2015, p. 
91). It seems that new institutional theory has adopted an assumption of organizations as amoral 
entities, despite Selznick’s (1957) original framing and his more recent attempt (1996) to re-infuse 
value into institutional theory.  It is new institutional theory’s inadequate attention to moral 
considerations which we seek to redress here.    
We advance Munir’s (2015) work in that the purpose of this paper is to explore the extent to which 
the moral dimension is an essential component in organizational life. While our focus is not on 
redressing the neglect of power directly, our interest in morality and institutional theory tackles this 
indirectly. We integrate institutional theory with MacIntyre’s (1994; 2007) conceptual framework of 
virtues, goods, practices and institutions to advance ‘old’ institutionalism’s concerns for “humane 
cooperative systems” (Selznick, 1996, p. 276), and thereby seek to reconcile ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
institutionalisms (Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012, p. 134). The purpose in other words, and 
with reference to Friedland & Alford (1991), is to bring morality back in.  
We set out to do this in two key areas of institutional theory, namely institutional logics and 
legitimacy. There is considerable work which identifies the co-existence of competing institutional 
logics and seeks to explain how such competing logics are (or are not) resolved (e.g., Bjerregaard & 
Jonasson, 2014; Chung & Luo, 2008; Greenwood, Diaz & Lorente, 2010; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Seo & 
Creed, 2002). Here we theorize that these tensions may be tied to virtuous activity and a concern 
with the telos of organizations.  Through MacIntryre’s (2007) work on practices, we offer a language 
which further explains the complexities of competing institutional logics, specifically how they relate 
to morality.  
Moreover, we acknowledge that institutional theory does indeed engage with ethics in relation to 
the concept of institutional legitimacy particularly in its moral dimension (see, for example, Scott, 
2001; Tost, 2011). However, this engagement is rather narrow in scope in that generally it is viewed 
from a ‘satisficing’ perspective (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008) where “the absence of negative 
‘problems’ is more important than the presence of positive achievements” (p. 60).  By contrast, a 
body of work based on MacIntyre’s conceptual framework of virtues, goods, practices and 
institutions (Beadle & Moore, 2011; Moore, 2012a; Moore & Beadle, 2006, for example) offers a 
more positive perspective and encourages a focus on morality as a fundamental aspect of 
organizations. We contend, and seek to demonstrate, that MacIntyre’s work provides a more 
meaningful way of ‘bringing morality back in.’  
Three research objectives guide our study. Specifically, we set out to: 
1. Extend institutional theory’s understandings of institutional logics, contradictions and 
legitimacy by integrating these with the work of the moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre; 
2. Empirically explore a moral account of organizational life through an integrated lens of 
institutional theory and MacIntyre in Christian churches in the north east of England; 
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3. Establish the extent to which the moral dimension is an essential component in 
organizational life in general and the implications of this for institutional theory in particular. 
In proposing this moral account of organizational life, our contributions are both theoretical and 
empirical. First, through MacIntyre’s work, we advance institutional theory by reintegrating ethics 
(Nielsen & Massa, 2013) into understandings of logics, contradictions and legitimacy. In doing this, 
we extend Friedland’s (2012a) discussion of the lack of values in institutional theory, as well as 
Klein’s (2015) work on values and institutional logics. Second, we further develop a MacIntyrean 
theory of organizations, extending an existing line of enquiry (for example, Kavanagh, 2013; Moore, 
2002; 2008; Mangham, 1995). It is of note that MacIntyre shares Marxist leanings with the origins of 
institutional theory (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 2015, p. 97), but we argue that 
his work presents a more nuanced and fuller account of the possibilities surrounding the moral 
nature of organizations, and that this presents a significant opportunity to better understand the 
possibilities of the moral nature of organizations. Third, in empirical terms, our contribution lies in 
exploring the moral dimension in organizational life in practice specifically in the case of Christian 
churches but also, by extension, with broader application to many (though not necessarily all) 
organizational types. 
In what follows we first introduce MacIntyre’s conceptual framework and then present an overview 
of relevant elements of institutional theory – logics, contradictions and legitimacy. We substantiate 
the claim that institutional theory lacks a positive account of the role of morality at the 
organizational level and demonstrate how MacIntyre’s work informs and extends institutional 
theory, in effect expanding on work already begun elsewhere notably in Beadle & Moore (2011). We 
then introduce and present an empirical study of Christian denominations in the north east of 
England, explaining our choice of this as a site for empirical research. The findings offer insights into 
both institutional and MacIntyrean theory, extending both in novel directions. But the main finding, 
consistent throughout the empirical evidence, is of practitioners’ concern with the telos (overall 
purpose) of their organizations and the core practices of their faith, and hence of the moral nature 
of organizational life. By extension, it is concluded that, for many organizational types, ignoring or 
underplaying the moral dimension will give, at best, a diminished account of organizational life, and 
hence that institutional theory needs to rethink its neglect of morality. 
 
MacIntyre’s Conceptual Framework 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s antipathy towards the capitalist system and to its institutions and organizations 
is well known (see MacIntyre, 2007, p. 1-108 for an extended discussion and, more recently, 
MacIntyre, 2015). The essence of his argument is that the emotivism of modernity leads to a 
localized morality in which social relationships are manipulated to suit the actor’s own preferences. 
Emotivism "is the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments 
are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are 
moral or evaluative in character" (Maclntyre, 2007, p. 11-12, emphasis in original). Hence emotivism 
"entails the obliteration of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative 
social relations" (ibid., p. 23). 
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We find such manipulative relations embodied in particular “characters” of which the manager is 
perhaps the prime example (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 74). But managers are, of course, situated within 
bureaucratic organizations and, as MacIntyre had earlier noted (1979; 1999), such social structures 
threaten moral agency and lead to compartmentalized lives. Hence, while there is at least a hint of 
sympathy for the manager ‘locked inside’ such organizations, MacIntyre singles out the modern 
corporation for particular criticism: "every society of course has invited individuals to inhabit roles 
with different requirements. But difference has not entailed the kind of separation, the kind of 
partitioning which is peculiar to corporate modernity" (Maclntyre, 1979, p. 132). 
Not all agree with MacIntyre’s strong negative stance on corporations and managers, arguing, in 
effect, that MacIntyre’s assessment is too pessimistic and that there is critical value to be gained 
from the application of his work to organizations in general and even to capitalist businesses. There 
has thus developed a body of work which has sought to apply MacIntyre’s conceptual framework to 
organizations of many types, and to management (Moore, 2008; Beabout, 2012).  Such work is 
extensive making both conceptual and empirical contributions and covering diverse practices and 
organizational types, for example health care, teaching, banking, oil, investment advising, circus and 
churches  (Beadle 2013; Beadle & Moore, 2006, 2011; Crockett, 2005; Fernando & Moore, 2015; 
Garcia-Ruiz & Rodriguez-Lluesma, 2014; Grandy & Śliwa, 2015; MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002; Mannion, 
2007; Moore, 2002, 2005a, 2005b, 2008, 2011, 2012a, 2012b; Moore & Beadle 2006; Murphy, 
Kallenberg & Nation, 1997; van de Ven, 2011; von Krogh, Haefliger, Spaeth & Wallin, 2012; Wilcox, 
2012; Wyma, 2015).  
MacIntyre’s conceptual framework draws attention to the moral nature of organizations in that 
purpose, goods and virtues are integral to organizational life. We set out MacIntyre’s conceptual 
framework in diagrammatic form in Figure 1 and provide definitions in tabular form in Table 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. An organization as an incorporated practice(s): Core practice(s) and Incorporation as the 
secondary practice of the making and sustaining of the corporate form 
 
 
CORE PRACTICE(S) 
Concerned through 
the exercise of virtue 
with the achievement 
of internal goods in 
pursuit of its purpose 
INCORPORATION OF CORE PRACTICE(S) 
Concerned with the achievement of 
external goods 
P  
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MacIntyrean concept and definition 
Organizational purpose 
“The extent to which the internal goods of the practice(s) at the core of the organization 
contribute to the overriding good of the community.” (Moore, 2012a, p. 366) 
 
Practice 
“Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through 
which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve 
those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form 
of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.” (MacIntyre, 
2007, p. 187) 
 
Internal goods 
The excellence of the products or services and the perfection of the practitioners in the 
process.1 (MacIntyre, 1994, p. 284; 2007, p. 189-190). 
 
Institutions (the ‘incorporated form’) 
"Institutions are characteristically and necessarily concerned with what I have called 
external goods. They are involved in acquiring money and other material goods; they are 
structured in terms of power and status, and they distribute money, power and status as 
rewards. Nor could they do otherwise if they are to sustain not only themselves, but also 
the practices of which they are the bearers.” (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 194) 
 
External goods 
Money, power, status, success. “It is characteristic of what I have called external goods that 
when achieved they are always some individual’s property and possession *and are 
therefore] characteristically objects of competition in which there must be losers as well as 
winners.” (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 190) 
 
 
Table 1. Key MacIntyrean concepts 
 
The starting point of this framework is that organizations may be re-described as practice-institution 
combinations. In practices, commonly referred to as social practices (von Krogh et al., 2012, for 
example), practitioners exercise virtues in pursuit of internal goods, and it is these – the excellence 
of the product or service and the ‘perfection’ of the practitioners in the process – which have the 
potential to contribute to the good of the community. In other words, the purpose of the 
organization is defined in relation to these internal goods and the extent to which they contribute to 
the overriding good of the community. The internal goods of the practice, and their contribution to 
the common good, thereby give definition to the moral dimension of organizational life. 
But practices need institutions: 
“For no practices can survive for any length of time unsustained by institutions. Indeed so 
intimate is the relationship of practices to institutions – and consequently of the goods 
external to the goods internal to the practices in question – that institutions and practices 
characteristically form a single causal order.” (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 194) 
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The institutional focus is therefore, and necessarily, on the achievement of external goods which are 
required for the sustenance of both the practice and the institution itself.  But, despite the “single 
causal order” of the practice-institution combination, this points to a fundamental tension which is 
central to MacIntyre’s sociology of organizations, the tension between the practice and the 
institution and hence between the pursuit of internal versus external goods. We will return to this 
below, but it is worth emphasising here that there is an ordering2 implicit in the conceptual 
framework such that practices should be prioritized over the institution since internal goods (which 
should be pursued for their own sake) take precedence over external goods (which should be 
pursued only for the sake of some further ends, in particular the flourishing of the same or other 
practices). Thus, the virtuous organization would place a limit on the pursuit of external goods so as 
not to distort the practice by, for example, prioritising organizational profit, reputation or even 
survival for their own sakes (a criticism directed at the Catholic Church in relation to the covering up 
of sexual abuse – see Gutierrez, Howard-Grenville & Scully, 2010).  
There are a number of further points which are worth highlighting.   First, while MacIntyre’s notion 
of “practice” is central to his understanding of where virtue operates, his definition of the term 
differs from its common usage – a point we will revisit below in relation to institutional theory’s 
usage. Second, it will be noted that MacIntyre’s usage of the term ‘institution’ also differs from its 
conventional usage in institutional theory,3 and so, for the purposes of this paper and in order to 
avoid confusion, we will henceforth refer to this as “incorporation” and thus to the “incorporated 
form” as being the “social bearer” (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 195) of the practice and to organizations as, 
on MacIntyre’s account, “incorporated practices.”4  
Third, one other element of the framework, and one of particular relevance to management (Moore, 
2008), is the secondary practice of the making and sustaining of the incorporated form – shown in 
Figure 1 by the smaller circle with the ‘P’ inside. This offers those who have ‘out-grown’ the core 
practice, and whose focus is on the incorporated form, the opportunity also to exercise virtues and 
gain internal goods from this rather different, and secondary, practice.  
Fourth, the question arises as to whether everything and anything can be considered a practice and 
so made subject to the implications of the framework as a whole. MacIntyre limits practices to 
activities which are sufficiently complex (“Bricklaying is not a practice; architecture is. Planting 
turnips is not a practice; farming is,” 2007, p. 187). Others highlight the importance of promoting the 
public (common) good as inherent to practices: “anything that does not promote the public good … 
may not be properly regarded as social practice” (von Krogh et al., 2012, p. 666). It is this view which 
we suggest allows for the transferability of MacIntyre’s work particularly to for-profit organizations. 
We will revisit this in the conclusion when considering the generalizability of our empirical findings 
to other organizational types. 
In summary, drawing from MacIntyre’s conceptual framework, so long as the organization has a 
good purpose,5 organizations become places where virtues can be both exercised and further 
developed, and where internal goods are obtained leading to the good of the community as well as 
the flourishing of practitioners. Even for actors involved primarily in the incorporated form, the 
secondary practice of making and sustaining this corporate form affords similar opportunities. Thus, 
on MacIntyre’s account, morality – defined in terms of purpose, goods and virtues – is integral to 
organizational life; he helps us to see that, within the limit described above, there is no such thing as 
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an amoral organization, indeed that organizations are “essentially moral spaces” (Beadle & Moore, 
2011, p. 103, emphasis in original). Given this, we argue that institutional theory needs to examine 
further whether morality is indeed an essential component within certain types of organizations and 
the implications of this in particular to our understandings of institutional logics, contradictions and 
legitimacy. It is to this that we now turn. 
 
Institutional theory: logics, contradictions and legitimacy 
Institutional logics and contradictions 
Studies of institutional logics have directed attention to how various societal spheres or institutional 
orders inform assumptions, beliefs, values and rules which give meaning to and guide actions of 
social actors in institutions and institutional fields (Klein, 2015; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). The 
main institutional orders are usually taken to be the market, the corporation (in the sense of a 
governance system), professions, family, community, religion and the state (see Thornton et al., 
2012, p. 66-72; Besharov & Smith, 2014, p. 366). Institutional logics are developed at a variety of 
levels – organizations, markets, industries, inter-organizational networks and organizational fields 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 106), and have practical effects. The socially constructed central logic 
of an institutional order also serves as a source of legitimacy (ibid., p. 108), most notably in relation 
to its relational and moral dimensions (see further below). Moreover, “such logics constrain and 
enable the potential agency of actors … enabling actors to make sense of their ambiguous world by 
prescribing and proscribing actions”, and thus provide “guidelines for practical action” (Suddaby and 
Greenwood, 2005, p. 38) or “a vocabulary of practice” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 94). In this way, 
agency becomes embedded such that institutional actors have partial but constrained autonomy 
(the paradox of embedded agency, Battilana & D’Aunno, 2009).  
Of particular interest to us is a stream of research which recognizes the co-existence of conflicting 
institutional logics and thus the inherent tensions in institutional arrangements and the implications 
for agency (Bjerregaard & Jonasson, 2014; Chung & Luo, 2008; Greenwood, Diaz & Lorente, 2010; 
Reay & Hinings, 2009; Seo & Creed, 2002). Reay & Hinings (2009), for example, identify the potential 
for competing institutional logics not to be resolved by one dominating the other, or by the ‘old’ 
logic being pushed underground and managed covertly (2009, p. 631-2), but by an accommodation 
through various mechanisms which allows their co-existence. Besharov & Smith distinguish between 
the compatibility of different logics which “imply consistent and reinforcing organizational actions” 
(2014, p. 367), or incompatibility as the reverse, and between the centrality of those logics – “the 
degree to which multiple logics are each treated as equally valid and relevant to organizational 
functioning” (2014, p. 369) – or otherwise. We argue that social actors’ concerns for organizational 
morality may help to further explain these tensions and how actors respond to competing logics.   
However, within all the work which neo-institutional theory has spawned, there is a concern 
expressed most notably by one of the originators of the institutional logics perspective that, “the 
most critical omission *is+ value” and that, “in their specification of the components of institutional 
logics *this omission+ likely derives from the … desire to avoid the normative legacy of the “old” 
institutionalism” (Friedland, 2012a, p. 585).6 Klein (2015, p. 332), however, notes that while 
Friedland “brings the notion of values and meanings to the ground, closer to the practices and 
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objects surrounding them”, he gives “fewer clues about how we can account for *them+.”7 We 
advance such a discussion of value in institutional logics and contradictions here. While Klein (2015) 
takes his argument in a theoretical direction only, we not only take our argument in a theoretical 
direction by integrating MacIntyre’s work, but also extend it in an empirical direction. First, however, 
we follow Friedland (2012a, p. 585) and look more closely at the possibilities of understanding value 
in institutional theory as “sources of legitimacy” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 56).  
Institutional legitimacy 
Legitimacy has been described as “perhaps the most central concept in institutional research” 
(Colyvas & Powell, 2006, p. 308), in particular because of the “pivotal role it plays in the survival of 
social systems” (Tost, 2011, p. 686). The generally accepted definition within institutional theory 
remains that given in Suchman’s foundational article (1995, p. 574): “A generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.”  
Legitimacy is understood as having instrumental, relational and moral dimensions (Tost, 2011, p. 
690-4). An entity will have instrumental legitimacy when it is seen as serving the goals of individuals 
or groups, and their legitimacy judgments will be based on the extent to which their goals are 
facilitated by the entity’s effectiveness, efficiency or utility (ibid., p. 694). Relational legitimacy 
occurs when individuals or social groups perceive the entity as affirming their own social identity and 
self-worth. Moral legitimacy is granted when an entity is perceived as being “consistent with the 
evaluator’s moral and ethical values” (ibid., p. 694). Evaluations of legitimacy are made 
simultaneously across all dimensions and the granting of legitimacy is always, therefore, contingent. 
For example, an individual may choose to shop at Tesco8 principally for reasons of its instrumental 
legitimacy (it is physically convenient and has most of what he wishes to purchase), while he may 
judge its relational and moral legitimacy as questionable. Thus, he would have good reason to take 
his custom elsewhere, particularly if a Co-operative store9 were to open in a convenient location. 
Legitimacy is also understood as having both internal and external dimensions. Internal legitimacy 
“relies upon emergent ‘bottom up’ practices” and results in “the acceptance or normative validation 
of an organizational strategy through the consensus of its participants” (Drori & Honig, 2013, p. 347). 
It is generally seen as having had far less attention paid to it (Brown & Toyoki, 2013, p. 2) than 
external legitimacy which “may be bestowed on an organization by external stakeholders who 
endorse the worthiness of its vision or objectives and its competence to efficiently work towards 
achieving the designated objectives” (Drori & Honig, 2013, p. 346, see also Deephouse & Suchman, 
2008, p. 54-5). In relation to this internal-external distinction, it is worth noting that legitimacy can 
be related to success in that it facilitates commitment from internal participants and enables 
resources to be accrued from external audiences (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008, p. 63). However, it 
is also worth noting that both the internal and external dimensions of legitimacy have a normative 
component reflecting a moral concern which might be more than simply the absence of the 
negative. 
Few papers directly make this link between legitimacy and morality, but Schroder’s (2012) empirical 
study is an exception. He reveals how moral arguments can frame perceptions of economic 
rationality, how they can be used to denounce management decisions as immoral and hence deprive 
managers of social capital and destroy public moral legitimacy. Thus, moral arguments can be, at 
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least, influential in, if not essential to, organizational life and operate largely through affecting 
internal and / or external moral legitimacy. Schroder’s study reinforces the point that institutional 
theory’s engagement with morality relies upon the notion of institutional legitimacy. However, the 
study also demonstrates that moral legitimacy relies upon the absence of the negative rather than 
the presence of the positive, thereby confirming Deephouse & Suchman’s (2008) contention that 
this is, at best, only a satisficing concept. How, then, might we develop institutional theory to make 
good this deficit? 
 
Extending institutional theory through MacIntyre 
Having summarized institutional theory’s key concepts, we are in a position to return to MacIntyre’s 
work to see how this may complement and extend them. In relation to institutional logics and 
contradictions, it ought to be the case that, at the organizational level, an institutional logic is 
realized, in MacIntyre’s terms, within the core practice(s) as providing “the socially constructed, 
historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules by which individuals 
produce and reproduce their material subsistence” (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 804, cited above).  
While the institutional logics literature uses the term “practices”, and even references MacIntyre 
with respect to these, the terminology – “forms or constellations of socially meaningful activity that 
are relatively coherent and established” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 128) – does not contain either the 
richness or the moral implications of MacIntyre’s use of the term. MacIntyre’s specific and detailed 
meaning of practice may therefore have something quite significant to offer to institutional theory, 
specifically addressing the underdevelopment between institutional logics and its use of practices 
which Thornton et al. (2012, p. 133-34) acknowledge. As above, MacIntyre’s definition helps us to 
see that logics impact directly on practices (his definition) within organizations. Thus, a shift to a 
market logic (see, for example, Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 107) will affect the practice and its moral 
basis if counteracting logics are not present. Moreover, MacIntyre’s understanding of practice also 
more fully illuminates how institutional logics are intertwined with individual and collective telos. 
This opens up space to better understand how and why social actors respond in the way they do 
when they experience competing logics: when their core practice is threatened in some way through 
competing logics, it may in turn trigger a particular response in order to maintain the core practice.   
MacIntyre’s framework of the incorporated practice also draws attention to the inherent tension 
within organizations which we noted above. While the focus should be on the exercise of virtue at 
the practice level, the single causal order of the incorporated practice is such that: 
“… the ideals and the creativity of the practice are always vulnerable to the acquisitiveness 
of [its incorporated form], in which the cooperative care for common goods of the practice is 
always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the [incorporated form]. In this context the 
essential feature of the virtues is clear. Without them, without justice, courage and 
truthfulness, practices could not resist the corrupting power of [the incorporated form+.” 
(MacIntyre, 2007, p. 194) 
Thus, the notion of institutional contradictions at the organizational level is enhanced by MacIntyre’s 
conceptual framework in identifying an inherent internal contradiction between the practice and its 
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incorporated form. Furthermore, such internal contradictions may well lead to the kind of collective 
action which institutional theory has identified, but now informed by the notion that it is 
practitioners (who often have less power than ‘institutional’ actors) who may seek to defend the 
practice against its corruption by the incorporated form. MacIntyre’s conceptual framework would 
also encourage those at the practice level to seek to dis-embed their agency to the extent that the 
practice is prioritized over its incorporated form, while recognizing its continued dependence. 
Further, if we look to institutional legitimacy, we propose that it is related to organizational purpose; 
one would expect an organization’s internal and external legitimacy to be higher, the ‘higher’ its 
purpose. In addition, MacIntyre’s distinction at the organizational level between practices and their 
incorporation enables us to see how internal legitimacy is likely to be based principally around the 
integrity of the core practice(s). External legitimacy, however, depends both upon the integrity of 
core practice(s) and the incorporated form, such that the organizational focus is seen as supporting 
the core practice(s) rather than its own survival or success per se.  
In relation to the instrumental, relational and moral dimensions of legitimacy, we propose that 
MacIntyre’s concepts help in understanding that instrumental legitimacy is achieved through a 
combination of the internal and external goods arising from both the core practice(s) and the 
incorporated form.  Relational legitimacy might be most effectively achieved when both internal and 
external audiences can identify with the practice(s) at the heart of the organization. And moral 
legitimacy is, on this account, more than just a satisficing concept but an essential component in 
organizational life as it relates to organization purpose, since it offers practitioners both the 
opportunity to exercise and develop the virtues within the practice, and thereby to produce and gain 
those goods which contribute to the achievement of their own and the community’s telos. By 
offering the focus on excellence at the practice level and success at the organizational level as being 
in constant but potentially constructive tension, MacIntyre also offers a way of seeing organizations 
as always struggling with the contingency of legitimacy – if the ordering between the practice and its 
incorporated form becomes disordered, legitimacy may be undermined. 
Summary 
We have suggested that MacIntyre’s work offers possibilities to advance institutional theory’s 
account of institutional logics, contradictions and legitimacy in five key ways. First, institutional 
logics are realized in and impact upon practices (MacIntyre’s definition). Second, that MacIntyre’s 
notion of a practice is both richer and draws attention to moral considerations in a way that 
institutional theory’s usage does not. Third, institutional logics are intertwined with individual and 
collective telos, and this may explain why actors respond in the way they do when their practice – 
the site of their moral engagement – is threatened. Fourth, the inherent internal tension between 
practices and their incorporated form gives an additional location for institutional contradictions. 
Finally, institutional legitimacy is related to organizational purpose, with internal legitimacy closely 
tied to the practice and external legitimacy both to the practice and its incorporated form, and with 
moral legitimacy dependent upon the practice and the way in which it contributes to practitioners’ 
and the community’s telos.  
But extending beyond these specific points, MacIntyre’s framework points to morality as an essential 
component of (practice-based) organizations, such morality being located within the internal goods 
of the practice (the excellence of the goods or services and the ‘perfection’ of practitioners in the 
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process) and their contribution to the common good. Morality is, therefore, brought back in to 
organizational life in a way that institutional theory, absent MacIntyre, cannot account for. Such 
theorization, however, requires empirical evidence to show whether and how it might apply in 
practice. Hence, it is to our empirical study that we turn next. 
 
Research context, design and data analysis 
The site for the empirical work was an ecumenical study of Christian churches. There is a growing 
body of research that looks to churches as an empirical site to extend understandings in organization 
studies in such areas as organizational change (Garland & Darcy, 2009; Plowman, Baker, Beck, 
Kulkarni, Solansky & Travis, 2007), identity and identification (Creed, DeJordy & Lok, 2010; Gutierrez 
et al., 2010; Kreiner, Hollensbe & Sheep, 2006), accountability (Mutch, 2012), reputation (Middleton, 
2009) and leadership (Grandy, 2013). This study fits within this genre, using the study of churches as 
organizations to explore concepts in MacIntyrean and institutional theory. It is not, therefore, a 
study of religion (King, 2008) nor of the ‘theology of organization’ (Sørensen, Spoelstra, Hopfl, & 
Critchley, 2012).  
Following Tracey’s (2012, p. 118) suggestion, in looking to a religious-based empirical site we 
“extend organizational institutionalism by exploring institutional ideas in a novel context” (for a 
further example of this type of study, see Peifer, 2014). However, this study is also purposive in two 
ways. First, it can be argued that churches are both institutions and organizations. That is, given 
religion as an institutional order and the hierarchical nature of most Christian denominations, we 
might expect to find “religious logics” (King, 2008, p. 215; Thornton et al., 2012, p. 132) imposing on 
practitioners and on the local levels of the church such as the parish, which can themselves be 
regarded as organizations. This interplay between institutions and organizations seemed, ex-ante, to 
offer potentially interesting empirical findings. In this way, we also respond to Greenwood, Hinings 
& Whetten’s (2014) call for more organization and management theory (OMT) studies that 
acknowledge context, specifically the understudied institutional order of religion.  
Second, given the values-driven nature of these organizations, churches were expected to be sites 
where morality was of significance and hence where nuances in the relationship between morality 
and organization might be explored. Indeed, consistent with MacIntyre’s argument that 
organizations differ in the extent to which they have been shaped by philosophical and cultural 
developments, churches may have preserved certain understandings and practices, and hence we 
may have much to learn from them. We thereby draw on Lawrence & Dover’s (2015) rationale for 
selecting an empirical site because the phenomenon under study would likely be important in that 
context. In doing so, we build upon the work of Tracey (2012) and Tracey, Phillips & Lounsbury 
(2014) and illustrate how religious organizations / institutions and those involved with them are 
relevant to OMT. 
The specific empirical context was a two-phase ecumenical study of churches in the north east of 
England, within the context of a broader project entitled “Receptive Ecumenism and the Local 
Church”, a five-year interdisciplinary study commencing in 2007 which attracted participation from 
most of the Christian denominations in the area.10  The first author was invited to join the research 
team and, given that, as above, churches provided a prima-facie example of organizations where 
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morality would be integral to their being and functioning, accepted. This is not to say, of course, that 
other religious organizations would not have been equally appropriate sites. The approach 
adopted11 was qualitative so as to develop a deep understanding of the lived experiences of actors 
involved (Silverman, 2000; Suddaby, 2010, p. 16) at different levels within and across 
denominations. 
The first phase involved a mapping (for example, demographics, constitution, structure) of each of 
the seven participating denominations at three levels (Regional, Intermediate, Congregational). 
Appendix A provides a description of the participating denominations (two Anglican Dioceses 
participated but were kept separate for analytical purposes). The breadth of theological 
understanding and organizational practice across the denominations allowed for genuine 
commonalities and differences, rather than just idiosyncrasies, to emerge. Having completed this 
largely desk-based exercise, a set of issues for churches as organizations emerged which were 
followed up in a second phase of the research. The second phase informs the basis of this paper. 
Purposive sampling (Silverman, 2000) was employed for the second phase which involved interviews 
(and one focus group with three participants) with key personnel at the three levels across 
denominations. This included a balanced mix of ordained and lay persons and 76 participants in total 
– see Table 2 for an overview of the denominational representation and abbreviations used. The 
purpose of such sampling was to gain a breadth and depth of view representative of each 
denomination rather than because particular differences within specific groups were anticipated. 
Three researchers, including the first author, were involved in conducting the interviews. One pilot 
was conducted at which one of the three researchers conducted the interview and the other two 
observed. A feedback session between the researchers was held to confirm the interview guide and 
to discuss and confirm interview protocols. The interview guide increased consistency across 
interviewers but at the same time it was recognized that meanings are created in interaction with 
respondents (Mason, 2002). Thus, despite the interview guide and prompts being developed in 
advance to facilitate a rich discussion, the conversations took the form of semi-structured 
interviews. Ethics approval was obtained from the appropriate University research ethics committee 
and all respondents completed a consent form. The interviews were recorded. 
The purpose of the interviews, which on average were one hour in duration, was to explore in more 
depth than Phase 1 had allowed the varying articulations of churches as organizations across the 
denominations and covered governance arrangements, mission and strategy, finances and, of 
particular relevance to this paper, a discussion of organizational arrangements. The questions 
pertaining to the organizational arrangements were framed broadly whereby participants were 
asked about the main elements of their faith and how the church (as an organization / institution) 
affected the practice of their faith. The purposes behind these particular questions were not 
elaborated, as they followed naturally from the previous discussion, and in practice respondents 
answered these readily (and, in some cases, rather fulsomely).       
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Anglican Diocese of 
Durham 
3 2 3 4 4 6 2 8 ANGD  
1-8 
Anglican Diocese of 
Newcastle 
3 2 3 4 4 6 2 8 ANGN  
1-8 
Assemblies of God 
Northumbria Region 
2 - 7 4 5 9 0 9 AoG     
1-9 
Northern Baptist 
Association 
6 - 4 4 6 8 2 10 NBA     
1-10 
Roman Catholic 
Diocese of Hexham and 
Newcastle 
5 3 4 6 6 8 4 12 RC        
1-12 
Methodist District of 
Newcastle 
3 2 5 5 5 7 3 10 METH   
1-10 
Salvation Army 
Northern Division 
5 - 4 6 3 6 3 9 SA        
1-9 
United Reformed 
Church Northern Synod 
3 2 5 5 5 5 5 10 URC     
1-10 
Totals 30 11 35 38 38 55 21 76  
 
Table 2. Denomination and interviewee details 
 
 
The process of data analysis and theoretical development was iterative and collaborative between 
the two authors. Independently, both authors first engaged in a process of ‘literal readings’ (Mason, 
2002) of the transcripts. Following this, collaboratively the authors engaged in ‘interpretative 
readings’ (Mason, 2002) and discussed initial interpretations. NVivo was then used as a tool for 
organizing the data and conducting coding. The initial coding was informed by the interpretative 
readings and collaborative discussion. The process was exploratory in nature and was intended to 
‘get a feel’ for the participants’ accounts, independently and then collaboratively. A number of 
broad codes were discussed including, agency, bridging community and faith, defying the institution, 
incremental change, learning, framework of accountability, stability and guidance.  
Given our general interest in churches as values-driven organisations and thus sites where we 
expected morality to be important, our next step was to re-read the data through a MacIntyrean 
lens. Thus, the starting point for our theoretical coding was informed by MacIntyre’s work. A type of 
template analysis (King, 2004) informed by a priori themes from MacIntyre’s work (for example, core 
practice, organizational purpose, internal versus external goods, the priority of  the practice over its 
incorporation, the tension between practice and incorporation) was followed to refine the broad 
codes from the early stages of the data analysis into more meaningful themes. For example, 
participants talked about how important their faith was to their lives and that they couldn’t imagine 
their lives without faith grounding them. We coded this as ‘telos’. Participants also talked about how 
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their commitment to their faith and the church was a “journey” (ANGD2) with others, always in 
progress and always requiring their attention. We coded this ‘commitment to excellence’ and 
‘practice’. When participants talked about their struggles to reconcile the good purpose of their faith 
and the organisation (e.g., unconditional love, giving back), with the “dogma” (URC10) that 
sometimes seem to drive decisions, we coded this as ‘tension between core practice and institution’.   
A concern for organizational purpose, its relationship to the core practice(s), and an apparent 
struggle to ensure the integrity of the practice and the purpose of the organization resonated across 
participants’ accounts.  
We were also intrigued by participants’ tendency to frame their responses within what we 
interpreted as broader teleological terms. While this latter finding may not be all that surprising, we 
felt to better understand the organisational and institutional implications of this, it warranted 
another complementary lens to further explain these complexities.  In collaborative discussions, it 
was the findings pertaining to telos and the tensions that surfaced in participants’ accounts which 
triggered our interest to go back to the literature on institutional logics, contradictions and 
legitimacy to further explain this. Informed by this understanding, a further stage of collaborative 
coding occurred in which the MacIntyrean themes which had already emerged were combined with 
concepts from institutional theory leading to a new set of integrated themes. Here we present the 
three core themes which emerged from this iterative process namely: Religious logic, organizational 
purpose, core practices and telos; Responding to institutional logics and contradictions as a moral 
project; and, Concerns for legitimacy.  
In the presentation of our findings, we take our lead from Pratt (2009, p. 860) and use “power 
quotes”, that is some of the most compelling accounts in the main text, and support these with 
“proof quotes” in Table 3 to highlight the salience of the themes in the wider study.   
 
Findings 
Religious logic, organizational purpose, core practices and telos  
Discussion with participants concerning the main elements of their faith was deliberately framed in a 
broad and general way, and was expected to elicit practical elements such as prayer and worship (as 
indeed it did). It was, however, common for respondents to frame their responses within a broader 
teleological / theological framework. We see this framing as, in effect, a statement of a religious 
logic, but also integral to organizational purpose, to the core practices of the church, and to 
individual telos, as is evident from the comments of ANGD2 and NBA2: 
“The main elements of my faith are that God loves me and every single member of the 
human race without condition … God is inviting us to work with him to make the world the 
sort of place he wants it to be.” (ANGD2) 
“Well, fundamentally it’s obviously a living relationship with Christ which is, you know, the 
hallmark of the faith.  And the, erm, the commitment to the evangelisation of the world, 
which is mission terms, right?” (NBA2)   
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In some cases this theological framework was very personal, as can be seen in the comments of 
AoG1: 
“My faith is that Jesus Christ died for me, to save me, and I belong to him, and he had 
guaranteed my salvation and I am going to heaven.” (AoG1). 
These quotes support Friedland and Alford’s claim that, in the case of religion, the institutional logic 
broadly speaking is transcendental truth and the “symbolic construction of reality within which all 
human activity takes place” (1991, p. 248). We interpret that these respondents’ statement of 
religious logic and, in the case of ANGD2 and NBA2, the commitment to organizational purpose and 
core practices of the church, is intimately tied to their own telos. We therefore note that 
institutional logics which are linked to an individual’s telos may be more compelling and explain 
actors’ practical actions.  
Generally, many of these statements bore some similarity to creedal statements without being 
recited in specifically creedal form, although the rather different religious logics of the various 
denominations were clearly evident. In a number of cases, as in the ANGD2 quotation above, it was 
clear that this teleological / theological position led directly into practical action, and more generally 
there was a link from beliefs via organizational purpose to core practices as in acts of service and 
proclamation (evangelism – as in the NBA2 quote above). ANGN1 also illustrates this vividly as s/he 
talks about how the church and its various practices (“the Eucharist”, “serve God in the world”, 
“proclaim the kingdom”, “perform acts of mercy”, “witness for peace and justice”) stem from his/her 
faith:  
“Well, I would see myself as a Catholic Christian.  I mean I believe in the Catholic faith. I 
mean I believe the Incarnation, God, grace, the sacraments, the Eucharist, the ministry.  And 
then the church having a duty to be … to serve God in the world.  And to go out to the world 
and to proclaim the kingdom and to … and perform acts of mercy and to witness for peace 
and justice.” (ANGN1) 
 
It is of note that participants from all denominations (though not every respondent) offered such 
statements (see further examples in Table 3). Thus, there is a clear relationship starting from a 
theological base (religious logic), through organizational purpose to the core practices of the church 
and linked to individual telos. That such statements and relationships arose in a church context may 
not be all that surprising, but we address the broader implications of this in the discussion.  
Responding to institutional logics and contradictions as a moral project  
We have noted that MacIntyre’s notion of a practice gives a specific locus for the realisation of 
institutional logics within organizations, and that for all denominations a clear exposition of the main 
institutional / religious logic and the link to practices was available. Thus, if the main institutional 
logic is taken to be about transcendental truth (as above), then this would be expected to find 
application in promoting the truth about God, and the spiritual nature of reality, as well as in more 
practical areas of concern. This is evident in the quotations from ANGD2 and ANGN1 above and can 
also be seen in the comments of SA8:  
“The word Salvation appears in our title, and our ministry is about the salvation of men and 
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women of the world, and within salvation, becomes a need to care not only for the spiritual 
aspect of the man or woman but also for the physical and mental aspects …” (SA8) 
The response to the institutional logic is therefore the pursuit of  organizational morality in the sense 
of what participants understood to be the purpose of their organizations and their core practices, 
which serve the overriding good of the community – see for a further example the ANGD7 quotation 
in Table 3.  
Unsurprisingly, however, there were also expressions of institutional contradictions. Some of these 
occurred in relation to the distinction between the core practices and the incorporated form, and 
demonstrated the existence of co-existing logics (for example, patriarchy and equality) and their 
accommodation. RC1, a member of the Catholic Church where only men can be priests, illustrates 
this: 
“Out there in [name of parish], a religious sister is in charge of that parish.  It’s fantastic.  I 
went there on visitation, the place was alive.  One mass,12 but the church was packed, and 
she had a group of young people there playing guitars and everything, and went into the hall 
then to meet the people afterwards and they find her terrific, you know.” (RC1) 
We interpret from RC1’s comments that actors are willing to accommodate co-existing competing 
logics as long as the purpose of the organization and its core practices remain intact. METH1, for 
example, described this accommodation as “tolerance” and the absence of a “straightjacket” (and 
see also the AoG5 and RC6 quotations in Table 3).  In this way, MacIntyre’s conceptual framework 
provides a path through which to explain how, when confronting competing logics, actors’ responses 
may be moral in nature.  
Following MacIntyre, we also interpret a prioritization of the core practice over its incorporated form 
as a moral project, whereby agents strive to pursue excellence in the practice and sustain the 
organization as virtuous. URC10 highlights how a core practice such as showing compassion should 
be prioritized over the concerns of the incorporated form such as following rules and regulations (for 
example, “getting the dogma right”): 
 “I am not convinced that the church as an institution is being quite what the church as seen 
in the New Testament ought to really be about.  But I would still suppose that I would rather 
try to work for its humanizing or whatever is required, from within, rather than be a critic 
from without … I think it’s important that the church is seen to care about people as people, 
rather than about getting the dogma right, that kind of thing, and within, the people are 
responsive, in some measure at least, to genuinely care, show compassion.” (URC10) 
We interpret that respondents RC1 and URC10 had a concern that the incorporated form was 
potentially unsupportive of the core practices and that the contradiction needed to be resolved in 
favour of the practice or an accommodation found in such a way that the core practices of the 
organization might continue to flourish – further evidence of a concern for the moral basis of the 
church. Following Besharov & Smith (2014), it could be argued that the exercise of members’ agency 
can lead to logic compatibility in that consistency in goals (in this case showing compassion) is more 
important than “the means by which goals are to be achieved” (p. 367), and by extension we argue 
that this is a moral project.  
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The empirical evidence and MacIntyre’s conceptual framework, therefore, help us to see that 
institutional contradictions may be located between the practice and its incorporation at the 
organizational level, rather than just at the institutional level. Interestingly, however, there was also 
evidence of contradictions between practices, an empirical finding that has not emerged in previous 
MacIntyrean studies (though see Note 5 for MacIntyre’s acknowledgement of this possibility), and a 
further point to which we will return in the discussion: 
“Personally my burden is that the institution of the SA has allowed the traditions of musical 
performance to highjack the living of faith, whereas they become more important than 
discipleship, so the institution that kind of nurtures and maintains that set of priorities is 
counter-productive to growing and moving on in faith, simply because the priority’s been the 
wrong way around.”(SA3) 
While our study is not longitudinal and therefore we cannot discuss how and if the conflicts were 
resolved, it is clear that SA3’s concerns were for the core practice of discipleship to regain its rightful 
place over what might be regarded as the sub-practice13 of musical performance. This again provides 
evidence of a moral concern related to the organization’s purpose through the prioritisation of the 
‘true’ core practice. 
Concerns for legitimacy 
As evidenced above by the focus on and realisation of organizational purpose and practices, the 
moral legitimacy of the church was of concern to respondents. This might be interpreted as a 
concern for both internal legitimacy (church members wanting to be associated with an organization 
that was legitimate in their own eyes), and external legitimacy (a desire for the church to be seen 
from the outside as a legitimate organization).  However, other dimensions of legitimacy were also 
in evidence, as may be seen from the comments of SA8 which, on close inspection, includes 
instrumental (“the world knows who we are”), relational (“I like our identity”) and moral (“the SA is 
to be trusted”), as well as internal (“I like the joy and the music and style”) and external (“the level of 
respect we are given within the community”) dimensions: 
 “Yes of course, because I like the ways we worship in the SA; I like the joy and the music and 
the style, I like our identity, I like our uniform, I like the fact that the world knows who we 
are.  Whether they think we’re crazy or not, that’s another issue, but they know the SA is to 
be trusted, and we have a huge level of respect within this nation which is almost in some 
cases unique; other ministers, other churches, denominations would give their eye teeth to 
have the level of respect that we are given within the community, and so all of those factors 
lead me to be a SA, and … I desire to be a SA officer.” (SA8) 
Specifically, with regard to external legitimacy we interpret from SA8’s account that it depends both 
on the core practices which the Salvation Army undertakes (implicit in the quotation above, but 
explicit in SA8’s earlier quotation), and upon the integrity of the incorporated form. SA8’s comments 
about how others (churches, denominations) “would give their eye teeth” to experience similar 
success may raise some question about the extent to which the organizational focus supports the 
core practice over privileging its incorporated form. However, it is clear that this reputation stems 
from the level of trust engendered through its core practices.14  
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Similarly, ANGN7 below reveals evidence of a concern for external legitimacy when s/he implies that 
the vicar has a positive reputation in the community, both in schools and pubs. We interpret that the 
references to “our church” and “where we come” to gather for various events speaks to external 
and relational legitimacy whereby ANGN7’s description of the vicar’s participation within this 
community demonstrates a favourable social identity. Similarly, we contend s/he also speaks to 
moral legitimacy in the suggestion that the church continues to be a desirable place for important 
life events such as baptisms, weddings and funerals. In this way, we conclude that legitimacy is tied 
to the integrity of both core practices and their incorporated form: 
 “And this is our church where we come – I mean I’m talking general perceptions – but it is 
very much perceived as our church where we come for baptism, quite a lot of weddings (not 
as many as we would like but quite a number), funerals.  The vicar is accepted and wanted 
around in the schools – all eight of them. The vicar is accepted and wanted around the 
pubs.” (ANGN7) 
Interestingly, associated with the desire for the moral dimensions of legitimacy, there was concern 
that this might be under threat – see below and also the SA5 and NBA9 quotations in Table 3. This 
concern also illuminates how institutional legitimacy is related to organizational purpose and 
practices – see the RC5 quotation in Table 3. This emerged from accounts whereby sub-practices (for 
example, musical performances – see above SA3’s account) jeopardized the integrity of the core 
practice and thus the internal, external and moral dimensions of legitimacy. As can be interpreted 
from ANGD2’s comments below, competing logics (for example, unconditional love versus 
marginalization and exclusion of particular groups) threaten the organizational purpose, core 
practice and in turn the internal, external and moral legitimacy of the organization:  
“Well, if we start off with my belief that God loves me and loves everyone unconditionally, 
the problem is that much of what the church is heard to say and sometimes to do seems to 
send a message which contradicts that. So whether that’s about the complication of getting 
married if you’re divorced, whether it’s the stuff about being gay ... possibly the stuff about 
the way we do and do not treat women,15 those can be perceived in the public arena as 
calling into question the stuff that for me is at the heart of the gospel. Now of course you 
can argue round that, but in terms of public perception, the church as organization isn’t 
always very helpful.” (ANGD2) 
While not surprising in the sense that the churches have been under attack from secular sources 
over their positions on matters of gender and sexuality, and equally unsurprising in the sense that 
churches would still be regarded generally as moral pillars in society, the concern for and over 
internal and external moral legitimacy, and of this being much more than simply a satisficing 
requirement, emerges from this empirical evidence. 
 
Theme Illustrative Accounts 
Religious logic, 
organizational 
purpose, core 
practices & telos  
I have a belief in God, and a 
belief in Jesus as the 
incarnation of God and of a 
way to God. A belief that we 
are all working toward the 
Right, honestly, faith is kind 
of based on the life and 
person of Jesus; we are 
seeking therefore to 
continue the work that he 
Well for me faith is about 
an awareness of God’s 
presence in and through 
creation, and something 
about the person of Christ 
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kingdom of God… which I 
would understand as working 
towards ourselves and the 
people around us and the 
world being as God intended 
it to be. (ANGN8) 
initiated, to do what we feel 
he would be doing in the 
society of this time; to 
explore with people the call 
he might have on their lives; 
to seek to help those that 
are suffering. There is an 
aspect of worship in that, 
encouraging people through 
worship; an aspect of 
charitable works in that; an 
aspect of evangelism in 
that, because we want 
people to experience what 
we experience. (METH7) 
in terms of giving – finding 
life through death, and 
that is self-giving love; and 
something about the Spirit 
as the unifying factor; so 
the Trinity is quite 
important to me 
personally in terms of that 
Trinitarian community … 
And church articulates 
that so the church is the 
living community of the 
body of Christ, so it’s 
actually very important to 
be part of a faith 
community … to me the 
church needs to be living, 
a living community of love, 
welcome, that articulates 
the concern for the other, 
and that self-giving love, 
that’s what it should be. 
(URC9)    
 
Responding to 
institutional 
logics and 
contradictions 
as a moral 
project  
… certainly there have been 
huge developments over even 
just the last decade away 
from institutionalization with 
a very small “i”. Things like 
the introduction of Common 
Worship and all of the 
freedom and different options 
that that provides for, things 
like the growth of Fresh 
Expressions
16
 explicit 
endorsement from the 
Archbishops for trying new 
ways of being church. 
(ANGD7) 
 
I would find the most often, 
the things to do with 
individuality, and grace, 
there you have the tension 
between organization, 
accountability, freedom; 
sometimes a church can 
swerve more toward 
accountability in the sense 
of control rather than 
freedom or individuality, all 
for the best intentions. It’s 
something you have to 
guard against, so there are 
tensions…there are times 
when it releases and times 
when it hinders. (AoG5)  
 
…how do you stay within 
the church? I said 
ultimately it will come 
down to how I imagine the 
person of Jesus Christ to be 
… Being open to the 
complexity, the paradoxes 
that are there in the Bible, 
in the scriptures. And a 
willingness to kind of 
explore what these things 
might mean and to do so 
in an honest way, with 
some integrity, without 
trying to dominate or 
dictate that this is how, 
this is what things mean. 
(RC6) 
 
Concerns for 
legitimacy  
I do have a concern that … the 
SA in terms of its history I 
think is helpful, but the means 
by which it delivers that 
mission today, you know I’m 
determined that it will be 
relevant to today, so 
changing the way in which 
the SA is represented on the 
street, publicly, … probably 
the reasons why we have 
problems with our profile is 
our Victorian past tends to 
I mean everything’s got to 
have a framework and 
structure I think for it to 
work… the bee in my bonnet 
really is just that church is 
not relevant to the everyday 
person any more and I think 
Jesus would find that really, 
really distressing … its lost 
touch I think with everyday 
life. (NBA9) 
 
Well, the church is a 
framework in which to 
operate.  It’s not there as 
an end in itself. It’s there 
to help us, you know, live 
our faith, celebrate it, and 
also to share it.  That’s 
how I see the church. (RC5) 
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stay with us, we’ve got to 
shed that, work within the 
organization to change that. 
(SA5) 
 
 
Table 3. Additional proof quotes 
 
 
Discussion 
The focus of this paper is on the extent to which the moral dimension is an essential component in 
organizational life and therefore as significantly more than a satisficing concept. Both conceptually 
and empirically we proposed a moral account of institutional theory by fusing notions of institutional 
logics, contradictions and legitimacy with MacIntyre’s work on organizational practices, purpose, 
goods and virtue. We discussed three themes from the analysis of our empirical data to demonstrate 
the significance of our conceptual work.   
The theme Religious logic, organizational purpose, core practices and telos revealed how 
respondents began discussing the elements of their faith by reference to their theological position, 
sometimes in a form that was close to a creedal statement, and this raised interesting questions 
about their reasons for doing so. We suggest that two theoretical perspectives, from MacIntyre and 
institutional theory, help to explain this. First, MacIntyre’s notions of “a chain of ‘for the sake of’ 
relationships” and therefore of “reasons for action” (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 131) may be of assistance. 
Rational action, he argued, is always accountable, such that answers to “Why did you so act?” 
questions (ibid., p. 131) take the form of a recounting of deliberations (which may have been implicit 
at the time of the action itself), in which the actor moves from a notion of the good to be pursued to 
a (series of) judgment(s) about which actions best move the agent towards that good. And this 
should lead, ultimately, to an ability to justify any particular action, to explain how this action is for 
the sake of its own good or towards some other good, such that it is in the end a constitutive part of 
the individual’s telos. By giving an account of their theological position and hence of their own telos 
in relation to their theological understanding, respondents were, in effect, providing reasons for the 
practical actions (related to organizational practices) which followed. 
It might be thought, at first sight, that this finding is unique to religious organizations or others 
(charities perhaps) where respondents might be expected to make such a link and that, as such, this 
study is too extreme a case to bring “into sharper focus … processes that can exist in other contexts” 
(Kreiner, Hollensbe & Sheep, 2009, p. 707). However, while we would not necessarily expect 
respondents in a business setting to supply a justification for their actions by way of a summary of 
(their belief in) capitalism or of the necessity of property rights, for example, we might properly 
expect them to be able to speak of their organization’s purpose and how its goods or services 
contribute to the common good. Otherwise, they would appear to be operating at best amorally and 
at worst emotively, with little awareness or concern for a higher purpose for their actions. In this 
respect, businesses and other organizations should be no different from religious organizations. But 
being able to provide (or being asked to do so) reasons for action, necessarily introduces a moral 
dimension to organizational life. 
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The second explanation stems from the fact that many of the statements made by participants in 
this study contained some creedal-like elements. We contend that this suggests an institutional 
influence in addition to the personal commitment thereby expressed and some relationship to the 
notion of institutional / religious logics. As discussed, the suggestion is not that respondents simply 
regurgitated mantras that their own denomination had supplied – the responses were too personal 
and clearly meaningful to the individuals concerned. But that institutional logics find practical 
expression in, in this case, statements of belief or “vocabularies of practice” (Thornton et al., 2012, 
p. 94), and result in practical action, is borne out by the empirical findings here. In this particular 
case, what the empirical evidence and MacIntyre’s framework add to institutional logics is the idea 
that institutional logics may be more compelling to institutional actors if they provide a link to the 
actor’s ultimate telos. Without such a relationship, the legitimacy of the logic is likely to be called 
into question and may serve as a trigger for resistance. This suggests that morality may be an 
important component in the practical realisation of institutional logics and extends the work of 
Friedland (2012a) and Klein (2015) on how values play a role in institutional theory.  
In doing this, we also extend Besharov & Smith’s (2014) conceptual work on multiple institutional 
logics. As noted earlier, in the face of competing logics (in the case of the Roman Catholic sub-field, 
patriarchy – where only men can be priests – versus inclusion and equality in leadership), members 
strive to resolve conflict through supporting the core practice and organizational purpose. Through 
the exercise of such agency they create consistency in goals (spiritual growth, engagement) leading 
to logic compatibility.  
Our contribution to offer a moral explanation to actors’ responses to competing logics also brings to 
light other broader implications of our empirical findings. It can be argued that increased interest 
and focus in academia and practice around workplace spirituality, sustainability, social enterprise 
and shared value (for example, Porter and Kramer, 2011) are efforts to link work and organizational 
life to an individual and collective sense of greater connectedness.  In doing so this gives rise to 
competing logics within organizations and institutional fields as actors strive to re-claim or re-define 
core practices and organizational purpose in a way that puts these into better order. By integrating 
MacIntyre and aspects of institutional theory as we have done here, it opens up avenues for further 
research to ‘unpick’ the morality of organizational life, at the individual, organization and 
institutional levels.  
In a related vein, our study illustrates how institutional contradictions are more than just a possibility 
but are indeed inherent between the practice and its incorporated form, an observation from 
MacIntyre’s conceptual framework and the empirical evidence which enhances institutional theory. 
That the practice and its incorporated form also exist, in MacIntyre’s terms, as a single causal order 
suggests that accommodation is not only possible but is also essential to organizational life. The fact 
that contradictions were also shown to exist at the level of practices within organizations (the role of 
music in the Salvation Army), also enhances both MacIntyrean and institutional theory, and it may 
be that when such conflicts arise there is a role for the incorporated form in adjudicating between 
practices, since it is perhaps able to see ‘best practice’ in a way that individual practices, with their 
own concerns, are unable to do (see Moore, 2002, p. 29). But, again, the focal role of practices and 
the need for contradictions to be resolved or accommodated, suggests that concerns for the moral 
basis of organizations need to be taken into account. 
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It was also noted above that there was a determination not to let the incorporated form ‘get in the 
way of’ the practices of faith.  This reinforces the point that, in this study at least, morality, in the 
sense of the achievement of the internal goods of the practice, held precedence over concerns with 
external goods such as reputation or success. Equally, as discussed in the theme Concerns for 
legitimacy, we suggest there is evidence here of the moral dimension of legitimacy from an internal 
perspective. For these respondents the moral legitimacy of the church was maintained only because 
the church enabled a focus on its core practices. Such a focus on moral legitimacy was also clearly 
more than just a satisficing requirement; without this the church as organization would be in danger 
of losing its moral legitimacy for participants, and there was some evidence that this was already 
happening in relation, for example, to issues over remarriage for divorcees, sexuality and gender. 
In relation to institutional legitimacy, aside from the internal dimensions discussed above, external 
legitimacy was also founded upon the practices of the church – practices in the form of, for example, 
social action in the Salvation Army and religious practices such as baptism in the Anglican Church. In 
other words, those external audiences which conferred legitimacy on the organization did so 
primarily on the basis of the practices at their core, and therefore focused their legitimation on the 
moral legitimacy of the churches. This suggests that the concern for moral legitimacy is much more 
than simply a satisficing requirement for both those inside and outside the organization. 
 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to explore the extent to which the moral dimension is an essential 
component in organizational life, and through this to re-infuse value into institutional theory via the 
integration of MacIntyre’s conceptual framework with key parts of institutional theory. We argued 
that MacIntyre’s notions, and in particular his concept of a practice, and the re-description of 
organizations as incorporated practices, have something quite powerful to contribute to the 
development of institutional theory. In doing so, we have sought to address Munir’s (2015) concerns 
for the absence of moral philosophy or ethics in institutional theory’s theoretical basis.  
The empirical evidence drawn from the study of Christian churches demonstrates that MacIntyre’s 
concepts have traction within organizations and, within the particular context of this study, suggests 
that morality is an essential component to an institutional understanding of organizations. Thus the 
main finding, consistent throughout the empirical evidence, is of practitioners’ concern with the 
telos of their organizations and the core practices of their faith, and hence of the moral nature of 
organizational life. Another way of putting this was that organizational actors were able to provide 
reasons for their actions (religious logics) which tied these back to organizational purpose and their 
own telos, and that concern for alignment between these, and the consequent preservation of 
organizational legitimacy, motivated practical action. 
The choice of churches as the object of the empirical study was quite deliberate, as sites where 
morality was expected to be of significance. This, of course, also represents the most obvious 
limitation of this study. Application to other value-driven organizations, where morality might be 
expected to be important, such as (non-profit) hospitals, charities and non-governmental 
organizations, and to some professions including those involved in health care, would seem to be 
straightforward. Here, morality as defined in the MacIntyrean sense would be expected to be 
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equally important. In relation to for-profit organizations, the ability to provide “reasons for action” 
linked to organizational purpose, and a concern for legitimacy in all its dimensions including the 
moral, suggests that morality may be a similarly essential component of organizational life.  
However, the key to the generalizability of the findings is whether the activity at the core of any 
particular organization can be legitimately described as a practice under MacIntyre’s definition, and 
whether, as von Krogh et al. (2012, p. 666) noted, the internal goods of the practice promote the 
public (common) good. In this respect, a recent debate, almost in the form of a dialogue between 
MacIntyre (2015) and Wyma (2015), is instructive. MacIntyre claimed that financial traders in 
particular, and the financial sector in general, could not satisfy the conditions of a practice: “the 
making of money, whether for oneself or for others, can … never be a practice” (personal 
correspondence cited in Wyma, 2015, p. 233). Wyma responded by arguing that the role of an 
investment advisor is “to enable the positive liberty of his or her client … [and] only one resource 
genuinely enables positive liberty in the fullest sense: money” (2015, p. 237, emphases in original). 
But this fails to answer MacIntyre’s critique that there is, at its heart, a “vice that informs the 
financial sector of the globalizing economy: growth both for the sake of growth and at the service of 
and as an expression of acquisitiveness” (2015, p. 17). Indeed, Wyma acknowledged that investment 
advising fails the public (common) good test by currently “contributing to the gap between haves 
and have-nots”, although he argued that this is not intrinsic to investment advising (2015, p. 241). 
There have been better arguments put forward in favour of financial services, and specifically 
banking in its traditional form, as a practice (Robson, 2015; van de Ven, 2011). In addition, the point 
has been made that many organizations must contain the vestiges of a practice, for if a particular 
organization did not then it “would have, in effect, “killed” itself from the inside by failing to sustain 
the practice on which it itself is founded” (Moore, 2005b, p. 679). And while this holds out the 
possibility that this may apply rather more widely than might be supposed, and therefore may 
include many for-profit organizations, the general conclusion to which this points is that it is only in 
organizations which can genuinely be regarded as being practice-based, and which make a 
contribution to the common good, that we should expect to find that morality is an essential 
component of organizational life.  
Hence, while further research is needed in a wider variety of organizations to substantiate the claim 
that morality is more than just a satisficing concept in practice-based organizational life in general, 
the conclusion of this paper is that this will indeed turn out to be the case. Hence, any understanding 
of practice-based organizations which ignores or underplays the moral dimension will give, at best, a 
diminished account of organizational life.  
Implications for institutional theory  
What, then, does this mean for institutional theory in general? By fusing core elements of 
institutional theory – logics and legitimacy – with MacIntyre’s work, we have demonstrated 
theoretically and empirically that morality is an essential component of practice-based 
organizational life. This implies that, in addition to the neglect of power (Munir, 2015), institutional 
theory needs to rethink its neglect of morality.  
In this regard we believe there are a number of fruitful ways forward. First, we suggest that one 
possible avenue for future research lies in exploring more fully how morality is embedded in and 
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transmitted between organizations as it relates to institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). Are core practices destabilized or strengthened in the processes of mimetic, normative and 
coercive isomorphism? Second, are we able to witness the unsettling of the taken-for-grantedness 
of organizational life when practices are threatened by their incorporated forms and a too single-
minded pursuit of external goods? In addition, how is the taken-for-granted nature of organizational 
life at the micro-level of individual actors (Thornton et al., 2012, pp. 23, 77) informed by concerns for 
morality at individual, organizational and institutional levels? Third, how does morality itself 
becomes institutionalized? In these, and potentially other ways, institutional theory might begin to 
make good its deficit and bring morality back in. We therefore invite institutional theorists and 
practitioners to pursue this agenda.   
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Notes 
1. MacIntyre does not qualify ‘perfection’ but it might more naturally be taken as referring to the 
development of the moral character, or the flourishing, of practitioners. 
2. This has previously been referred to as the balancing of the pursuit of internal and external goods (see 
Moore, 2012a), but we judge the notion of ordering to be closer to MacIntyre’s (and Aristotle’s) intention 
– see Morrell (2012, p. 44-5) for a critique. 
3. For further elaboration of this point see Moore (2011, p. 50; 2012a, p. 365). 
4. Incorporation might appear to have overtones of business, where companies are often referred to as 
incorporated into a legal entity or as corporations. However, the term is much wider and originally refers 
to “uniting in one body”, from the Latin corpus. Thus, for example, UK universities are educational, 
charitable and chartered corporations. An alternative has been suggested by Kavanagh who distinguishes 
between institutional and core practices (2013, p. 107), but this is felt not to provide sufficient 
terminological differentiation. 
5. It is acknowledged that there must be, as it were, a ‘scale of goodness’. Even for organizations which 
might be deemed not to have a good purpose, there is the potential for agents to exercise virtues and 
obtain internal goods; there is honour even among thieves. However, this will always be a distorted 
practice and the external evidence of the exercise of the virtues (theft in this case) will always fall short of 
desirable social standards and will thereby infect the practitioners such that they fail to achieve their own 
telos (overall purpose in life) of eudaimonia (“blessedness, happiness, prosperity. It is the state of being 
well and doing well, of a man’s being well-favoured himself and in relation to the divine”, MacIntyre, 
2007, p. 148). MacIntyre himself recognizes that there may be practices “which simply are evil”, though he 
doubts whether such activities fall within his concept of a practice, and he also recognizes that 
engagement in a practice may be corrupting when “the desire to excel and to win” takes over, or when 
becoming engrossed in one practice results in neglect of another – painting over family, for example 
(2007, p. 200, emphasis in original). 
6. This criticism is directed at the authors of The Institutional Logics Perspective, Thornton et al. (2012), but 
might be made more broadly. Friedland (2012b, p. 8-9) refers to institutional value as “substance”, an 
Aristotelian category which is line with the MacIntyrean ideas developed in this paper: “A substance is the 
metaphysical foundation of the institutional logic, which provides the telos of the subject, the basis of her 
identity and an ontology of the objects deployed in her practice.” 
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7. We should also note that the first part of Klein’s title – “Bringing values back in” – links back to Friedland 
and Alford’s (1991) paper, as does ours. We had, however, already used “Bringing morality back in” in 
earlier versions of this paper before Klein’s work was published, and so decided to retain it. 
8. The UK’s supermarket chain with the highest market share, although recent events, particularly associated 
with an over-statement of profits, and an investigation into its relations with suppliers amid concerns it 
breached the Groceries Supply Code of Practice, have raised questions about even its instrumental 
legitimacy – see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-29306444 and 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-31143452, accessed 12 August 2016. 
9. Possibly the UK’s most ethical supermarket, certainly in relation to the range of Fair Trade products it 
stocks. It is, however, generally more expensive than Tesco, and has also been in financial difficulties (see 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/mar/24/co-op-groups-troubles-not-limited-co-op-bank, 
accessed 12 August 2016, for example), such that its instrumental legitimacy may also be somewhat 
questionable. 
10. See Murray (2008) on Receptive Ecumenism more generally. 
11. The overall “Receptive Ecumenism” project had three research themes – the organizational theme is 
reported on here, the other two being leadership and ministry, and learning and formation. 
12. We assume this refers to limitations in the number of Masses offered, due to the unavailability of a (male) 
priest, and hence the introduction of other forms of worship. 
13. Although MacIntyre does not refer to sub-practices, the notion of core and sub-practices has already been 
developed in a church context (McClendon, 1997, p. 92). 
14. This would also reinforce Middleton’s (2009) findings in relation to the Salvation Army in Australia, where 
its reputation and external legitimacy survived child sexual abuse scandals. 
15. This was probably by way of reference to the debate within the Church of England over whether women 
who, since 1994, have been ordained priests, could become bishops. This was resolved in 2014 with a vote 
in favour by the General Synod, and the first woman bishop was consecrated in January 2015. 
16. Fresh Expressions is a UK-based initiative, “a form of church for our changing culture, established primarily 
for the benefit of people who are not yet members of any church” – see 
http://www.freshexpressions.org.uk/, accessed 12 August 2106. 
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Appendix A  Description of participating denominations 
Anglican: Modern Anglicanism is both episcopal and synodical in its governance.  While it retains 
Bishops in Dioceses, the only formal exercise of primatial power which the Archbishop of Canterbury 
has is as convener of consultative instruments of the communion; he is devoid of juridical power, 
occupying a position more akin to a presidency. At the local level Parochial Church Councils are the 
local form of church government, sharing responsibility with the incumbent and church wardens. In 
between Parishes and Dioceses is a further intermediate structure of Deaneries, which are also 
synodically governed. 
The Assemblies of God is a specific grouping of Pentecostal Churches which have taken 
denominational form.  The movement owes much to the Pentecostal revival experienced in America 
during the early part of the Twentieth Century and finding formal expression in Britain in 1924. 
Pentecostal churches privilege an experiential theology. There is no overarching structure of church 
order.  The individualism of interpretation is matched at the congregational level by the autonomous 
nature of the church order. 
The Baptist Association: Baptist churches have been founded in the England since the 1640s. 
Baptists affirm liberty of each church to discern the mind of Christ for itself. While ministers, elders 
or deacons take the initiative in governance, it is the Church Meeting – a meeting of all church 
members – which makes decisions by consensus or formal vote. Independency is meant to be 
balanced by an interdependency which is reflected in the life of regional associations and a national 
union.  
The Roman Catholic Church. Catholic self-understanding traces its lineage back to the first apostles 
through apostolic succession. Episcopally led, authority rests primarily with Bishops, on whom the 
fullness of the sacrament of orders and juridical authority is conferred by episcopal consecration. 
While hierarchical in structure, authority is not simply something possessed by an individual, but is 
shared in various grades of ministry; a participatory form of authority.  This is underlined by the 
collegial nature of oversight operative in the Bishop’s Council. As with Anglicanism, Deaneries 
operate between the Diocesan and Parish levels. 
Methodism: Charles Wesley formed his first religious society, subsequently known as ‘Methodist’ in 
1729, as part of the evangelical revival. The Church is non-conformist, and led by synod (Methodist 
Conference), not episcopal. Its key organizing principle is the Connexion – ministers are appointed to 
a circuit rather than individual churches. Circuits generally have fewer ministers than churches, and 
lay local preachers lead a majority of services. The Connexional principle ensures that societies have 
a global sense of priorities.  
The Salvation Army opted for an episcopal form of government expressed in the language of the 
military. The adoption of a military style governance led to the commissioning, and later ordination 
of soldiers and officers. The hierarchy allows for daily decisive decisions to be made in a field of rapid 
mission engagement. It is well-known for its social action. 
The United Reformed Church came into being in 1972 as the result of a union between the 
Congregational Church in England and Wales and the Presbyterian Church of England and is firmly 
rooted within the English dissenting tradition. It is led by synod. In local congregations, ministers of 
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word and sacrament share with elders in a ministry of leadership and pastoral nurture, and also in 
the decision-making processes of the wider councils of the Church.  
 
